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DISRUPTING TERRORIST FINANCING WITH CIVIL LITIGATION
Jack D. Smith* & Gregory J. Cooper†
While the direct costs of mounting individual terrorist attacks are 
relatively low, maintaining a terrorist network is an expensive undertaking. 
To promote a veil of legitimacy, large terrorist organizations must spend 
tens of millions on propaganda and ostensibly legitimate social or charita-
ble activities such as hospitals, schools and other pubic works. They raise 
the money largely through fundraising efforts worldwide, including “witting 
and unwitting” contributions from mosques, non-governmental organiza-
tions, wealthy donors, and charitable foundations. Criminal prosecutions 
alone have not stopped such contributions because of insufficient prosecu-
torial resources and the high standards of proof required for criminal con-
victions. Unleashing legions of private attorneys to pursue civil actions 
against individuals and organizations, including charities and banks, in-
volved in the chain of terrorist financing may be a much more credible de-
terrence, especially when combined with the triple damages provisions of 
18 U.S.C. 2333 (a). 
INTRODUCTION
The international community has taken numerous steps to thwart 
terrorism in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York City 
and Washington, D.C. Most of these can be grouped under the four prin-
ciples laid out in the Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the European 
Union in 2005: “Prevent, Protect, Pursue, and Respond.”1 But perhaps the 
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ton, D.C. for 16 years where he oversaw the recovery of $6 billion owed to failed banks, 
after which he founded the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) in Basel, Swit-
zerland in 2006. Now living in Basel, Mr. Smith has authored a number of articles, including 
“The Recovery of Stolen Assets: A Fundamental Principle of the United Nations Convention 
on Corruption” for the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center, available at
http://www.u4.no/themes/uncac/documents/U4Brief2_2007_asset-recovery.pdf. 
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1 See Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy,
14469/4/05 REV 4 (Nov. 30, 2005), available at http://www.nederlandineuropa.nl/docum
enten/Veiligheid/The%2520EU%2520counter-terrorism%2520strategy.pdf. 
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one that will prove most effective for suppressing terrorism over the long 
term is the severing of funding and support networks, which the European 
Union categorizes under the “Pursue” principle.  
As recently stated by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 
“[d]isrupting funding flows creates a hostile environment for terrorism, con-
straining the overall capabilities of terrorists and helping frustrate their 
ability to execute attacks.”2 Governments invariably turn first to their crimi-
nal procedures to attack terrorist financial networks. However, our research 
and experience indicates that civil procedures may often be an even more 
effective tool to stop the financing of terrorism. 
Part I of this article describes the vital importance of donations from 
sympathizers to large terrorist organizations and posits that the best way to 
dry up those funds is to freeze and confiscate the wealth of people who 
finance murder and terror. Part II describes some of the historical difficul-
ties in recovering the assets of crime and corruption hidden overseas, and 
explains how the situation has improved since 2005 when the United Na-
tions Convention against Corruption came into effect. Part III discusses the 
power, scope and legal issues surrounding 18 U.S.C. 2333(a), a 1992 statute 
that provides a civil remedy to victims of terrorism to recover damages from 
terrorists and those that provide them material support. Part IV discusses 
recent section 2333(a) filings against banks and private companies, as well 
as other civil court remedies useful in the fight against terrorist organiza-
tions. Our conclusion is that widening avenues for private attorneys to seek 
damages in the civil courts may prove to be the most effective weapon of all 
against the spread of terrorism.
I. WHY PURSUE ASSETS?
Terrorist organizations do not need a lot of money to build bombs. 
The 2002 Bali  Bombings by Jemaah Islamiya cost approximately $50,000, 
and the 2004 Madrid attacks by an Al Qaeda inspired terrorist cell cost ap-
proximately $10,000.3 Trying to detect and thwart transfers of such small 
amounts is generally a fruitless exercise. Gary M. Osen, a New Jersey attor-
ney who is leading a series of high profile terrorist financing actions against 
banks, aptly compares it with “trying to shut down the phone company by 
going to people’s homes and apartments and individually smashing their 
phones instead of destroying the satellites and cables that conduct the sig-
nals.”4
2 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, TERRORIST FINANCING 4 (2008), available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf.  
3 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 7. 
4 Robin Finn, Cutting Off Terror's Money Supply, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007, at B4. 
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The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental 
body composed of thirty-two countries and two regional organizations.5
Established in 1989, its mission is the “development and promotion of na-
tional and international policies, to combat money laundering and terrorist 
financing.”6 In February 2008, the FATF released a report on Terrorist Fi-
nancing,7 which noted that although most direct terrorist operations require 
only tens of thousands of dollars, those expenses are just the tip of the fi-
nancial iceberg.8 There is a much larger requirement for funding which lays 
unseen under the water in the form of broader organizational requirements: 
Funds are required to promote a militant ideology, pay operatives and their 
families, arrange for travel, train new members, forge documents, pay 
bribes, acquire weapons, and stage attacks. Often, a variety of higher-cost 
services, including propaganda and ostensibly legitimate social or charita-
ble activities are needed to promote a veil of legitimacy for organizations 
that promote objectives through terrorism.9
As an example, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates 
that Al Qaeda spent about $30 million a year to sustain its activities before 
September 11, 2001.10 Contrary to popular belief, Osama bin Laden did not 
use his personal wealth, which he inherited from the Bin Laden construction 
company when his father passed away. Instead, Al Qaeda’s activities were 
supported largely through fundraising efforts worldwide, including “witting 
and unwitting” contributions from mosques, non-governmental organiza-
tions, internet users, wealthy donors, and charitable foundations.11
These contributions constitute the life blood of large terrorist organ-
izations. They are essential not just to executing bombing operations, but 
also to win and keep the hearts and minds of their supporters. This is the 
money that law enforcement must target to sap community support of the 
terrorists and to devitalize their attacks. The FATF Report recognizes that: 
“Even the best efforts of authorities may fail to prevent specific attacks. 
Nevertheless, when funds available to terrorists are constrained, their over-
5 Financial Action Task Force, Members & Observers, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379_32236869_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb.16, 
2009).
6 Financial Action Task Force, History of the FATF, http://www.fatfgafi.org/document/ 
63/0,3343,en_32250379_32236836_34432255_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb.16, 2009). 
7 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 2. 
8 Id. at 7. 
9 Id.
10 JOHN ROTH ET AL., NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S.,
MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING 19 (2004). 
11 Id. at 17. 
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all capabilities decline, limiting their reach and effect.”12  This was brought 
home in 1995 by Ramzi Yousef, one of the terrorists captured after the 1993 
World Trade Center bombing, as he was being flown over the twin towers 
on his way to a New York jail. When an FBI agent pointed out that the tow-
ers were still standing, Yousef replied, “They wouldn’t be if I had enough 
money and explosives.”13
There is no doubt that in the absence of an effective deterrent, pas-
sionate appeals such as “Islam is under attack” can bring in large amounts 
of money from sympathizers. However, there are limits to how far empathy 
goes, and for most ordinary people it does not stretch to the point of jeopar-
dizing their personal savings. Even the most dedicated criminals are more 
concerned about losing their personal fortunes than spending time in jail. 
One of the best statements of this mindset came from Gaspare Mutolo, a 
Mafia don turned pentito,14 during his testimony before the Anti-Mafia 
Commission hearings held in Italy in 1992: “The worst feeling is when our 
money is taken away from us. People prefer to be put behind bars and keep 
their money than to stay free without the money. Money is the main 
thing.”15
Mutolo’s confession provides insight to a best practice: in order to 
dry up funding to terrorist organizations, authorities need to do more than 
just prosecute contributors and put them in jail. They must also freeze and 
confiscate the wealth of people who finance murder and terror. As discussed 
below, it is fortuitous from a global perspective that there has never been a 
better time to recover assets tainted by crime than now. 
II. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ASSET RECOVERY
In the past, efforts by developing countries to recover stolen, cor-
rupt, or illicit assets stored in foreign countries were long and complicated 
affairs. For example, the Philippines spent seventeen years in litigation be-
fore recovering $658 million of the estimated $3 billion looted and stashed 
overseas by former President Ferdinand Marcos.16
12 Id. at 27. 
13 James Risen & David Johnston, A Day of Terror: Intelligence Agencies: Officials Say 
They Saw No Signs Of Increased Terrorist Activity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A21.
14 The Italian word “pentito” refers to a former member of the Italian Mafia who provides 
testimony to law enforcement officials in exchange for protection, immunity, or both. See,
e.g., Antonio La Spina, Recent Anti-Mafia Strategies: The Italian Experience, in ORGANIZED 
CRIME: CULTURE, MARKETS AND POLITICS 200–01 (Dina Siegel & Hans Nelen, eds., 2008).  
15 Verbali della Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia [Minutes of the Parliamentary 
Antimafia Commission], 11th Leg. 1236 (1993), available at http://www.liberliber.it/bibliot
eca/i/italia/verbali_antimafia_xi_legislatura/html/violante01/index.htm. 
16 Simeon V. Marcelo, The Long Road from Zürich to Manila: The Recovery of the Mar-
cos Swiss Dollar Deposits, in RECOVERING STOLEN ASSETS 89, 92 (Mark Pieth ed., 2008). 
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The historic practices of financial institutions, which stored stolen 
funds, explain the reasons behind lengthy and complicated recovery efforts. 
When a “victim” country tried to pursue corrupt assets, the institution stor-
ing the funds would interpose the well-established legal privilege of bank 
secrecy. That would frustrate the recovery effort absent an extraordinary 
intervention by the government of the “recipient” country. However, before 
the government of a recipient country would act, it would often require the 
victim country to first obtain a criminal judgment or other official determi-
nation against the alleged guilty party. Without help from the recipient 
countries, such determinations were difficult to obtain. How could the vic-
tim country demonstrate that there was stolen money stashed in the recipient 
country unless the recipient country helped by providing bank records and 
evidence? It was a vicious “catch 22.” Therefore, successful international 
efforts at asset recovery were few and far between. The inability to engage 
in effective asset recovery became a larger and larger problem for develop-
ing countries. When public officials opportunistically engaged in corrup-
tion—whether by stealing domestic tax revenues, skimming aid payments 
donated for development by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in-
ternational organizations or foreign governments, or taking kickbacks from 
sweetheart deals—storing those funds in foreign financial institutions pro-
vided a great deal of protection.17
As the developed world ignored the situation, corruption festered 
and retarded efforts to help developing countries grow out of poverty. In 
2003, the United Nations reported that during the 1990s, a period in which 
people were relatively euphoric about global progress, “54 countries actual-
ly got poorer.”18 International organizations now uniformly agree that cor-
ruption has been a major impediment to social progress in developing coun-
tries for the past fifty years. The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) states that “minimizing corruption is critical to reduce poverty and 
promote social and people-centered sustainable development,”19 and the 
World Bank identifies corruption as “the greatest obstacle to reducing 
[global] poverty.”20 Both organizations resolved to move aggressively 
against corruption.  
17 Hearing on Offshore Banking, Corruption, and the War on Terrorism Before the H. 
Comm. on Int’l Relations, 109th Cong. (2006), available at  http://commdocs.house.gov/com
mittees/intlrel/hfa26777.000/hfa26777_0.htm. 
18 Jess Bravin, Poor Nations Saw Living Standards Decline in 1990s, WALL ST. J., July 9, 
2003, at A2. 
19 United Nations Development Programme, Democratic Governance, http://www.undp. 
org/governance/sl-par.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
20 World Bank, Anticorruption, http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/index
.cfm (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
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As a result, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) led a worldwide effort to focus attention on attacking corruption, 
which culminated in 2003 with the adoption of the United Nations Conven-
tion against Corruption (UNCAC). With seventy-one articles containing 
numerous new and aggressive tools to combat corruption, the UNCAC is a 
remarkable document of unprecedented scope and application. The fact that 
131 countries and the European Community have become parties to the 
Convention within a relatively short period of five years after its adoption is 
evidence of the growing global consensus against corruption.21
Recognizing the complicity of financial institutions in the conceal-
ment and laundering of corrupt and illegal assets, the UNCAC promulgated 
clear provisions applicable to banks. These included “know your customer” 
requirements, increased scrutiny of “politically exposed persons” and en-
hanced reporting mechanisms for suspicious transactions. Chapter 5 of the 
UNCAC is devoted entirely to “Asset Recovery,” and it begins with a po-
werful statement: “The return of assets pursuant to this chapter is a funda-
mental principle of this Convention, and States Parties shall afford one 
another the widest measure of cooperation and assistance in this regard.”22
The Convention facilitates the recovery of assets by requiring that 
states amend their laws to enable the confiscation of the proceeds of crime 
and revise their laws so that bank secrecy is no longer absolute. Article 
31(7) of UNCAC provides that: “each State Party shall empower its courts 
or other competent authorities to order that bank, financial or commercial 
records be made available or seized. A State Party shall not decline to act     
. . . on the grounds of bank secrecy.”23 A further boost for asset recovery 
came on September 17, 2007, when the UNODC joined forces with the 
World Bank and officially launched the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative 
(StAR Initiative).24 The StAR Initiative seeks to implement the Convention 
by helping countries build capacity for mutual legal assistance, creating 
partnerships to share information and expertise, and establishing a joint 
funding vehicle to provide assistance to states for asset recovery cases.25    
Whereas there used to be only a rocky trail fraught with hazards for 
the unwary, these developments demonstrate that the international commu-
nity is working together to pave a clear highway for asset recovery. It is 
21 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Signatories to the United Nations Conven-
tion against Corruption, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2009). 
22 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, art. 51, U.N. Doc. A/58/422 (Nov. 
2003) [hereinafter UNCAC]. 
23 Id. art. 31(7).  
24 Press Release, World Bank, World Bank and UNODC to Pursue Stolen Asset Recovery, 
2008/061/PREM (Sept. 18, 2007), available at http://go.worldbank.org/08LGHMJT10. 
25 Id.
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only a matter of time and political will before this highway is completed and 
cleared of construction hazards. There is no reason why the same highway 
cannot be used for the recovery of assets connected to terrorist activities in 
both criminal and civil courts. Article 35 of the UNCAC already requires 
State Parties “to ensure that entities or persons who have suffered damage 
as a result of an act of corruption have the right to initiate legal proceedings 
against those responsible for that damage in order to obtain compensa-
tion.”26 Article 54(1)(a) requires each State Party “to permit its competent 
authorities to give effect to an order of confiscation issued by a court of 
another State Party.”27 There is no policy justification for allowing these 
advanced asset recovery procedures and concepts in corruption cases and 
not in cases involving terrorism.
III. UNITED STATES CIVIL ACTIONS UNDER 18 U.S.C. 2333(A)
The United States has a number of criminal statutes addressing 
money laundering and terrorism which constitute the backbone of its legal 
arsenal to confront terrorism. The primary focus of this article, however, is 
on the effectiveness of civil procedures for recovering assets as a comple-
mentary tool to thwart financing of terrorism—most notably 18 U.S.C.        
§ 2333(a),28 which is grounded upon two criminal provisions 18 U.S.C.          
§ 2339B29 and 18 U.S.C. § 2339C.30 Unlike criminal prosecutions, which 
26 UNCAC, supra note 13, art. 35. 
27 Id. art. 54(1)(a). 
28 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (West 2007).  Section 2333 was passed as part of the Anti-Terrorism 
Act of 1992 to enhance civil remedies for the victims of terrorism following the murder of 
Leon Klinghoffer aboard the hijacked ship Achille Lauro. See MARITIME TERRORISM AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 119-20 (Natalino Ronzitti ed. 2000). Section 2333(a) provides that: 
Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business 
by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or 
heirs, may sue therefor [sic] in any appropriate district court of the United States 
and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, 
including attorney’s fees. 
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (West 2007). Federal courts—including the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit and the Eastern District of New York—have held that “interna-
tional terrorism” includes violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B and 2339C. Boim v. Quranic 
Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1014–15 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Linde v. Arab Bank, 384 
F.Supp 2d 571, 580 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (setting forth the plaintiff’s claim that 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2339B and 2339C are predicates of international terrorism); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, No. 
CV-06-0702, 2006 WL 2862704 at *1 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Violations of 18 USC §2339B and 
§2339C are recognized as international terrorism under 18 USC 2333(a).”). 
29 Section 2339B provides that: 
Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist 
organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, [is guilty of a crime]. . . . To violate 
this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated 
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are expensive for the government and take a long time, civil cases funded 
by private plaintiffs offer the government a relatively inexpensive and effec-
tive way to combat the financing of terrorists. The Justice Department’s 
prosecution against the Holy Land Foundation, formerly the largest Islamic 
charity in the United States, illustrates the length and expense of criminal 
prosecutions involving terrorist financing.31
On July 27, 2004, a federal grand jury in Dallas, Texas, returned a 
forty-two count indictment against the Holy Land Foundation, with charges 
including conspiracy, providing material support to Hamas (a designated 
foreign terrorist organization), tax evasion and money laundering.32 Howev-
er, on October 22, 2007, District Court Judge Joe Fish declared a mistrial 
because the trial jurors had become deadlocked on the most significant 
counts.33 The Justice Department reduced its indictment against the Holy 
Land Foundation to thirty-two counts and a subsequent retrial resulted in 
guilty verdicts against the Holy Land Foundation and five of its leaders on 
November 24, 2008.34
terrorist organization . . . , that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist 
activity . . . , or that the organization has engaged in or engages in terrorism . . . .  
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (West 2007). Section 2339B(g)(4) indicates that “the term ‘material 
support or resources has the same meaning as in section 2339A.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4) 
(West 2007). According to Section 2339A, “the term ‘material support or resources’ means 
currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false 
documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal sub-
stances, explosives, personnel, and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.” 
18 U.S.C. § 2339A (West 2007).
30 Section 2339C(a)(1), provides, in relevant part, that: 
Whoever . . . , by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully pro-
vides or collects funds with the intention that such funds be used, or with the 
knowledge that such funds are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out . . . 
[an] act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any oth-
er person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, 
when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, 
or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from 
doing any act, shall be punished . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1) (West 2007). In this subsection, “provides” includes “giving, donat-
ing, and transmitting” and “collects” includes, “raising and receiving.” See 18 U.S.C. § 
2339C(e)(4)–(5) (West 2007).  
31 Eric Lichtblau, Islamic Charity Says F.B.I. Falsified Evidence Against It, N.Y. TIMES,
July 27, 2004, at A1.  
32 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Holy Land Foundation, Leaders, Accused of Providing 
Material Support to Hamas Terrorist Organization (July 27, 2004), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/July/04_crm_514.htm.  
33 Jason Trahan & Michael Grabell, Judge Declares Mistrial in Holy Land Foundation 
Case, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 22, 2007, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sh 
aredcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/102207dnmetholyland.1878fd716.html. 
34 Jason Trahan & Tanya Eiserer, Holy Land Foundation Defendants Guilty on All Counts, 
THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 25, 2008, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sha
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The Justice Department intends to use the Holy Land case, which is 
the largest terrorist financing prosecution in history, as a “portable blue-
print” for future prosecutors to turn “traditional and massive intelligence 
cases” into successful criminal prosecutions.35 Supporters of the Holy Land 
Foundation charge that the entire prosecution is but one of numerous exam-
ples of the government’s overreaching in trying to stop terrorism financing, 
and the case may not be over. Nancy Hollander, lawyer for defendant Mr. 
Abu-Baker, said that her client intends to appeal on due process grounds, 
including that the government improperly used anonymous testimony of an 
expert.36
While the Holy Land Foundation case appears to be a substantial 
victory for the government, it cost millions of taxpayer dollars, fifteen years 
of investigation, and two long trials to obtain the guilty verdicts. Concerns 
about just such difficulties of proof and expense of proceedings have 
prompted some trial specialists to urge that Justice Department prosecutors 
look to making greater use of civil statutory tools against terrorists financing 
in lieu of criminal proceedings.37 An article published in the March 2005 
United States Attorney’s Bulletin presented a lengthy exposition on that 
issue.38 The article listed the numerous advantages of using civil procedures 
in lieu of criminal procedures, including: 
more efficient allocation of scarce law enforcement resources;  
less resource intensive evidence gathering procedures;  
redcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/112508dnmetholylandverdicts.1e5022504.html. 
35 Jason Trahan, Holy Land verdict could be Boost for Obama’s War on Terror, THE DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 7, 2009, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/
news/washington/stories/010709dnnatobamaterror.3c26567.html.
36 Abdus Sattar Ghazali, The Holy Land Foundation Retrial Ends with Conviction of its Five 
Former Officials, AMERICAN MUSLIM PERSPECTIVE, Nov. 26, 2008, http://archives2008. 
ghazali.net/html/holy_land_verdict.html. 
37 Some Department of Justice lawyers advocate using “traditional” criminal money laun-
dering statutes for prosecuting complex cases rather than recently passed terrorist statutes. 
See, e.g., Stefan Cassella, Terrorism and the Financial Sector: Are the Right Prosecutorial 
Tools Being Used, 7 J. OF MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 281 (2004).  One example is 18 
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A), which makes it a crime to send money out of the United States with 
the intention of promoting another crime, including inciting violence in a foreign country. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) (West 2007). Property traceable to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1956(a)(2)(A) is subject to both civil and criminal forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 and 
982, and the combination of these provisions could be easier to apply and create the same 
material impact on terrorist financiers as more recently added anti-terrorism statutes. To 
address people who are smuggling large sums of money out of the country to terrorists or 
anyone else, the simplest alternative might be to charge them with a conspiracy to violate 18 
U.S.C. § 1960 by operating a money remitting business without a license. Conviction carries 
a possible five-year prison term and forfeiture of any property used in the offense. 
38 See Darrell D. Dorrell & Gregory A. Gadawski, Counterterrorism: Conventional Tools 
for Unconventional Warfare, U.S. ATT’YS. BULL., Mar. 2005, at 1.  
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easier use of publicly available information sources;  
less stringent chain of custody requirements;  
achievement of more rapid results because of evidentiary considera-
tions, and availability of summary judgments and injunctions; 
 use of the “clear and convincing evidence” and “preponderance of 
evidence” standards of proof which are less rigorous than the “beyond 
a reasonable doubt” standard required in criminal proceedings; and 
increased flexibility to employ third parties as consultants, contrac-
tors and witnesses.39
The authors of that article point out that, like drug dealers migrating 
to different money-laundering techniques as law enforcement closes older 
ones, terrorists will progress to the next avenue—businesses, real and 
sham—that can facilitate funds flow. They make a persuasive case that tra-
ditional civil techniques of proving misconduct such as alter ego, fraudulent 
conveyance and solvency analysis will help law enforcement to keep pace 
with the evolution towards ever more covert and convoluted structures.40 Of 
course, these same considerations and techniques are equally available to 
victims of terrorism seeking redress under 18 U.S.C. § 2333. 
The effectiveness of civil proceedings against the funders of terror-
ism is currently being tested in a 2002 civil lawsuit against an array of indi-
viduals and organizations in the United States (including the Holy Land 
Foundation) with alleged connections to the militant group Hamas. In De-
cember 2004, a federal jury in Chicago, Illinois, found the defendants liable 
for $156 million for providing material support to Hamas.41 Hamas alleged-
ly murdered a seventeen-year-old American citizen named David Boim as 
he waited at a bus stop outside Jerusalem in 1996.42  A three-judge panel of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment for 
a number of reasons including that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate 
an adequate causal link between the actions of the defendants and David 
Boim’s murder.43 Circuit Judge Evans dissented in part, noting: “The plain-
tiffs’ burden in this civil suit was to prove their case by a mere preponder-
ance of the evidence, and that, I think, they have accomplished.44
On June 16, 2008, the decision of the three-judge panel of the Se-
venth Circuit was vacated, and the case was set for argument before the 
39 See id. at 4. 
40 See id. at 36.  
41 See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute, 340 F. Supp. 2d 885 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Gretchen 
Ruethling, Judge Awards $156 Million in Terror Death, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at A4. 
42 Id.
43 Boim v. Holy Land Foundation, 511 F. 3d 707,756 (7th Cir. 2007). 
44 Id. at 760, n.1. 
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court en banc.45 The Seventh Circuit invited parties to file supplemental 
briefs addressing “[w]hether a donor to an organization that, the donor 
knows, practices terrorism, can be liable under 18 USC 2333(a) in the ab-
sence of proof that the donor intended to advance the violent component of 
the recipient's activities.”46
On December 3, 2008, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc affirmed 
the $156 million jury verdict against two of the appellants, reversed with 
instructions to enter judgment in favor of one of the appellants, and reversed 
and remanded for further proceedings against the last appellant.47 As to the 
question of intent under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), the majority opinion held that 
“Anyone who knowingly contributes to the nonviolent wing of an organiza-
tion that he knows to engage in terrorism is knowingly contributing to the 
organization’s terrorist activities.”48 The majority provided the following 
two justifications: 
The first is the fungibility of money. If Hamas budgets $2 million for ter-
rorism and $2 million for social services and receives a donation of 
$100,000 for those services, there is nothing to prevent its using that mon-
ey for them while at the same time taking $100,000 out of its social servic-
es "account" and depositing it in its terrorism “account.” 
Second, Hamas’s social welfare activities reinforce its terrorist activities 
both directly by providing economic assistance to the families of killed, 
wounded, and captured Hamas fighters and making it more costly for them 
to defect (they would lose the material benefits that Hamas provides 
them), and indirectly by enhancing Hamas’s popularity among the Pales-
tinian population in providing funds for indoctrinating schoolchildren.49
The en banc decision in the Boim case appears to have cleared away 
the major obstacles complicating the use of section 2333(a) against the 
funders of terrorism. Even should the U.S. Supreme Court choose to grant 
certiorari to assess the intent issue with regard to section 2333(a), it seems 
unlikely that the Court would require proof of intent to fund terrorist activi-
ties for these cases. Such a ruling would create the absurd result of permit-
ting every defendant to escape liability simply by claiming that the dona-
tions were “intended” solely for the social activities of the terrorist group 
and not for its killing enterprises. The law is not so blind or powerless. 
There is no conflict between circuit courts about the issue of intent 
under section 2333(a). In fact, the Boim en banc decision is squarely in ac-
45 Boim v. Holy Land Found., No. 00 C 2905, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12925 (7th Cir., 
June 16, 2008) (vacating judgment and granting rehearing en banc).  
46 Id.
47 Stanley Boim v. Holy Land Foundation, No. 05-1815, slip op. (7th Cir. 2008). 
48 Id. at 25.  
49 Id. at 24–25.  
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cord with the decision by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Afshari.50 In 
Afshari, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that citizens should be al-
lowed to contest the correctness of terrorist designations before they can be 
found criminally liable for providing material support under 18 U.S.C. §  
2333B, one of the predicate statutes underlying  18 U.S.C. §  2333(a). The 
question is not whether the designation was correct (procedures are availa-
ble for the designated entity to litigate that issue), or whether some citizens 
might not agree with the designation, or whether some people might still 
want to support social services provided by the organization in spite of the 
government’s determination.51 The government has the responsibility and 
authority to make those designations, and if the donor knows about the de-
signation, a violation occurs whenever a donation is made, regardless of the 
intent or desire of the donor.  
There is no dispute that violations of both 18 U.S.C. § 2339B and § 
2339C are covered by 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). Sections 2339B and 2339C con-
trast sharply with regard to an intent requirement. Section 2339B has no 
“intention” clause: “Whoever knowingly provides material support or re-
sources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, 
shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.”52 Section 2239C has 
an explicit “intention” requirement: “Whoever . . . willfully provides or 
collects funds with the intention that . . .  such funds are to be used, in full or 
in part, in order to carry out . . . [an] act intended to cause death or serious 
bodily injury to a civilian . . . shall be punished . . . .”53
It is obvious that when Congress wants to require a prior intention, 
it knows how to insert the relevant language. That it did not do so in Section 
2339B implies that Congress expected that once an organization has been 
designated a terrorist organization, persons would be entirely prohibited 
from contributing anything of value to it regardless of the donor’s motive or 
intent. That policy is sensible because donations to terrorist groups for so-
cial purposes are subtly sinister. They enable the organization to pose as an 
honorable humanitarian group, thereby increasing its support in the com-
munity for the benefit all of its operations, including the execution of terror 
attacks. Congress was not trying to create a loophole for terrorist organiza-
tions—it was trying to strangle them out of existence. That will not happen 
if people are permitted to ignore the fungibility of money and continue to 
50 See Unites States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, Rahmani v. 
United States, 127 S. Ct. 930 (2007).  
51 Id. at 1162 (“The Constitution does not forbid Congress from requiring individuals, 
whether they agree with the Executive Branch determination or not, to refrain from furnish-
ing material assistance to designated terrorist organizations during the period of designa-
tion.”).
52 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (West 2007). 
53 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1) (West 2007) (emphasis added).  
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make donations to terrorist organizations to conduct so-called peaceful or 
social operations with their left hands while committing mayhem and mur-
der on multitudes of innocent civilians with their right hands. 
IV. ADDITIONAL CIVIL TOOLS FOR DISRUPTING TERRORIST
INFRASTRUCTURES
Over time persistent attacks on the financial underpinnings of ter-
rorist organizations can lead to their collapse. Perhaps the best example of 
this is the pioneering work of the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), 
which was established in 1979 in Montgomery, Alabama. Over the last 30 
years the SPLC has shut down some of America’s largest hate organizations 
by helping victims of racist violence sue for monetary damages. The most 
prominent domestic terrorist organization in the United States during the 
20th century was the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). In its second resurgence during 
the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, the KKK had thousands of mem-
bers, and perpetrated hundreds of hate crimes and murders primarily across 
the rural American South. Yet the KKK was eventually brought to its knees, 
not by battalions of soldiers, but instead by a small, dedicated group of non-
government trial lawyers litigating civil actions often in conjunction with 
parallel criminal proceedings.  The following cases illustrate SPLC’s suc-
cesses: 
Donald v. United Klans of America.54 In 1981, several members of 
the Alabama chapter of the KKK, the United Klans of America 
(UKA), were charged for the murder of Michael Donald, a nineteen-
year old African American who had been beaten to death and left 
hanging from a tree in Mobile, Alabama.55 After criminal charges 
were filed against individual Klansmen, the men implicated in the 
murder quickly turned on each other. Morris Dees, the Director for 
the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) went after the UKA’s as-
sets, linking their policies and practices to Donald’s murder.56 A jury 
found the Klan organization guilty and subsequently ordered it to pay 
$7 million in damages to the victim’s mother.57 As the UKA did not 
have sufficient assets to pay the damages, the victim’s mother re-
ceived the deed to the UKA’s national headquarters in Tuscaloosa, 
54 Donald v. United Klans of America, No. 84-0725 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 12, 1987), available 
at http://www.splcenter.org/pdf/dynamic/legal/beulahvunklan_judgment.pdf. 
55 See Klan Member Put to Death in Race Death, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1997, at A24.  
56 See Associated Press, U.S. Jurors Award $7 Million Damages in Slaying by Klan, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 1987, at A1.  
57 See id.
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Alabama which had a market value of $225,000.58 The loss of the 
property was devastating to the UKA.59
Macedonia Baptist Church v. Christian Knights of the Ku Klux 
Klan.60 In 1998, a civil lawsuit filed by the SPLC in response to the 
burning of an African-American church in South Carolina resulted in 
$37.8 million being awarded against several Klan organizations and 
individuals. This was the largest judgment against a hate group in the 
United States, and although the award was later reduced to $21.5 mil-
lion, it forced the Klan to give up its land and headquarters and “trans-
formed the Christian Knights from one of the most active Klan groups 
in the nation to a defunct organization.”61
Gruver v. Imperial Klans of America.62 In 2008, a jury awarded $2.5 
million in damages to a Kentucky teenager who was severely beaten 
by members of the Imperial Klans of America because the Klansmen 
mistakenly thought he was an illegal Latino immigrant. The SPLC is 
seeking to enforce the judgment by seizing the group’s assets, includ-
ing its headquarters, a 15 acre compound in Dawson Springs, Ken-
tucky.63
Tactics similar to SPLC’s are now being employed in the United 
Kingdom. On April 2008, a Belfast, Ireland court began hearing a $21 mil-
lion civil case against five men alleged to have been responsible for the pa-
ramilitary car bomb attack carried out by the Real Irish Republican Army 
(RIRA), on August 15, 1998, in Omagh, Northern Ireland.64 Twenty-nine 
people died as a result of the attack and approximately 220 people were 
injured. In other instances, the British government is succeeding in squeez-
ing terrorist financing through criminal means. For example, on October 17, 
58 See id.; see also Anti-Defamation League, Decline of the United Klans of America,
http://www.adl.org/issue_combating_hate/UKA/decline.asp (stating market value of head-
quarters).
59 Anti-Defamation League, Decline of the United Klans of America, http://www.adl.org/i 
ssue_combating_hate/UKA/decline.asp.
60 Macedonia v. Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, No. 96-CP-14-271, (S.C. Ct. of 
C.P. July 24, 1998), available at http://www.splcenter.org/pdf/dynamic/legal/macedoniavk 
kk_judgment.pdf.  
61 Southern Poverty Law Center, Macedonia v. Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan: 
Church Burning Case, http://www.splcenter.org/legal/docket/files.jsp?cdrID=29 (last ac-
cessed Feb. 2, 2009).  
62 Gruver v. Imperial Klans of America, 07-CI-00082, (Ky. Cir. Ct. Nov. 20, 2008), avail-
able at http://www.splcenter.org/legal/docket/files.jsp?cdrID=69&sortID=0. 
63 See Ann O’Neill, Jury awards $2.5 Million to Teen Beaten by Klan Members, CNN, 
Nov. 14, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/11/14/klan.sued.verdict/index.html.
64 Tom Peterkin & Emma Henry, Omagh Bombing: Civil Case Opens in Belfast,
TELEGRAPH (U.K.), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1584193/Omagh-
bombing-Civil-case-opens-in-Belfast.html.
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2008, in an agreed legal settlement, an alleged former leader of the IRA, 
Thomas “Slab” Murphy, and his two brothers paid over £1 million in prop-
erties and cash to the authorities in Britain and Ireland in settlement of a 
global crime and fraud investigation in relation to proceeds of crime asso-
ciated with smuggling and money laundering. In another action reminiscent 
of the United States proceedings against the infamous Chicago mobster Al 
Capone, Murphy is fighting a claim in the Irish courts for tax evasion, relat-
ing to non-completion of tax returns for eight years from 1996.65
In America, victims of terrorist acts have had legislative authority to 
sue certain state sponsors of terrorism since 1996 when Congress amended 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).66 United States courts have 
awarded victims of terrorism more than $19 billion against state sponsors of 
terrorism and their officials, most of which remains uncollected.67 As part of 
a rapprochement with Libya in August 2008, the United States Department 
of State settled existing private terrorism claims against Libya for $1.5 bil-
lion, an amount which did not please a number of the private plaintiffs.68
Nevertheless, many people believe that these kinds of private actions do 
have an influence on state behavior. For example, in a suit against the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran for its role in the 1983 bombing of the United States 
Marine Corps barracks in Beirut Lebanon, Dr. Patrick Clawson, deputy di-
rector of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, testified that civil 
judgments for acts of state-sponsored terrorism have had a noticeable im-
pact upon the present regime in Iran.69
Foreign organizations are beginning to recognize that they cannot 
easily ignore civil suits brought against it in United States courts. In 2008, 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which is not a foreign state, 
requested a court to vacate a section 2333(a) default judgment against it and 
allow it an opportunity to defend the case on the merits.70 The motion was 
65 Republican Slab Murphy ordered to give up 1 million pounds, BELFAST TELEGRAPH,
Oct. 18, 2008, available at http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/republican 
-slab-murphy-ordered-to-give-up-pound1million-14007463.html. 
66 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq. (West 2007). 
67 See Jennifer K. Elsa, Suits against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, CRS Report 
for Congress, Aug. 8, 2008, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL31258.pdf.
68 See Kimberly Kindy, Families Who Sued Libya See Their Victory Voided, WASH. POST,
Dec. 23, 2008, at A3.
69 See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46, 58 (D.D.C.2003). In 2007 
a $2.65 billion judgment was entered against Iran. Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 
F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C., 2007). 
In 2008, garnishment writs were issued against BP, Shell, Vitol and Venezuela's state owned 
oil company ordering them to hold onto any assets belonging to the Iranian government. See
Cindy George, Federal Judge in Houston Joins Iran Collection Case, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
June 22, 2008, at B4.  
70 Knox v. The Palestine Liberation Organization, 248 F.R.D. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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granted, but with a requirement that the PLO post a bond for $192.7 million, 
the full amount of the earlier default judgment.71
It may prove easier to recover on judgments against organizations 
found in the chain of terrorist financing than those against state sponsors of 
terrorism. A number of private attorneys have filed cases that extend the 
reach of 18 U.S.C § 2333(a) beyond just charitable organizations. For in-
stance, victims of terrorist attacks have filed a series of lawsuits against 
banks alleged to have provided financial services to terrorist groups.72 It is 
clear from a review of regulatory enforcement actions that a number of 
banks have failed to implement sufficient controls on high-risk accounts to 
safeguard against money-laundering, corruption and terrorist financing.73
These controls are important protections against crimes such as drug traf-
ficking and terrorism. If a bank has allowed them to lapse, it may be expos-
ing itself to liability to private lawsuits under 18 U.S.C. § 2333. This poten-
tial liability, if nothing else, creates a strong incentive for banks to tighten 
their compliance procedures, thereby cutting off the flow of money to ter-
rorists through formal banking channels.  
A good example is Linde v. Arab Bank,74 one of nine similar law-
suits against Arab Bank. Arab Bank is one of the largest banks in Jordan 
with $27 billion in assets and branches in Europe, and until recently, in the 
United States.75 In July 2004, six American families who were victims of 
Palestinian terrorism in Israel during the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 
2002 sued Arab Bank for $875 million under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 
2333. Plaintiffs claimed that Arab Bank had dispersed millions of dollars of 
support payments to families of suicide bombers, thereby encouraging fur-
ther attacks.76 Because Arab Bank routed the money through its New York 
office in order to convert into U.S. currency, the State of New York had 
jurisdiction. As motions to dismiss were denied on September 2, 2005, the 
case is currently proceeding through discovery to trial.77
After the Linde case was filed in July 2004, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) investigated Arab Bank’s New York 
71 Id. at 431. 
72 Steve Anderson, Dirty Banking: Financial Institutions Face Suits Over Alleged Antiter-
rorism Act Violations, INSIDE COUNSEL, May 1, 2008, at 38. 
73 See, e.g., FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
74 See Linde v. Arab Bank, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 575–76 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
75 In re Fed. Branch of Arab Bank, Assessment of Civil Money Penalty, No. 2005-2, 1 
(Dep’t of Treasury, Aug. 17, 2005),  available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/files
/arab081705.pdf. 
76 Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 575–79. 
77 See id. at 591. 
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branch.78 A Consent Order issued on February 24, 2005, required Arab 
Bank to reduce the banking activities of its New York branch and shut down 
its wire transfer operations.79 On August 17, 2005, the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network entered into a Consent Order with Arab Bank that 
levied a $24 million dollar fine against the Bank for “fail[ing] to implement 
an adequate system of internal controls to comply with the Bank Secrecy 
Act and manage the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing.”80 On 
May 11, 2005, NBC News reported that the FBI and the Justice Department 
had opened a criminal investigation into the Bank’s activities.81 It appears at 
least in this instance, Section 2333 is working as it was intended.  
Of course, Section 2333 is not the only route to liability for organi-
zations involving themselves in the financing of terrorist organizations. In 
Almog v. Arab Bank,82 one of the sister cases to Linde, the Court upheld the 
ability of foreign nationals to sue Arab Bank in federal court under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, for causes of action including 
violating the law of nations by financing suicide bombings by Hamas and 
other terrorist groups, and aiding and abetting in the execution of crimes 
against humanity. 
In addition to charities and banks, private companies have also 
found themselves targets of Section 2333. Over a half dozen complaints 
seeking billions of dollars in damages have been filed in the District Courts 
in Miami and New York against Cincinnati-based Chiquita Brands Interna-
tional, accusing the well-known banana grower of providing terrorists with 
money, guns and ammunition.83  In March 2007, “Chiquita agreed to pay a 
$25 million fine to settle a criminal complaint with the U.S Justice Depart-
ment, which accused it of paying the United Self-Defense Forces of Colom-
bia, known by its Spanish acronym AUC, more than $1.7 million from 1997 
to 2004.” 84 The U.S. government had previously designated the AUC as a 
78 In re Fed. Branch of Arab Bank, Consent Order No. AA-EC-05-12 (February 24, 2005), 
available at http://occ.gov/FTP/EAs/ea2005-14.pdf.
79 Id.
80 In re Fed. Branch of Arab Bank, Assessment of Civil Money Penalty, No. 2005-2, 4 
(Dep’t of Treasury, Aug. 17, 2005), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/file
s/arab081705.pdf. 
81 NBC Nightly News: Terror Ties At a Middle Eastern Bank? (NBC television broadcast 
May 11, 2005). 
82 Almog v. Arab Bank, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
83 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Chiquita Brands International Pleads Guilty to Making 
Payments to a Designated Terrorist Organization and Agrees to Pay $25 Million Fine (Mar. 
19, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/March/07_nsd_161.html. 
84 Christine Kearney, Chiquita Sued in NY Over Killings in Colombia, REUTERS, Nov. 14, 
2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/americasCrisis/idUSN14211578.
82 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:65 
foreign terrorist organization.85 Chiquita says that it “was forced to make 
such payments to both left- and right-wing organizations to protect the lives 
of our employees at a time when kidnappings and murders were frequent.”86
In view of the strenuous efforts of the United States and other governments 
to suppress the AUC and the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia), one cannot help but wonder why it was so important for Chiqui-
ta to give the terrorists sustenance. It would be better to have quit the area 
completely than give millions of dollars to terrorist groups, which would 
use the money to buy guns and explosives to murder and kidnap innocent 
people.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that asset recovery actions are becoming an important 
part of the solution to two of the worst problems plaguing the world: terror-
ism and corruption. The United States can push the frontiers of asset recov-
ery but it cannot achieve success against either problem on its own. The 
tentacles of terrorism stretch into many countries, and the U.S. can never 
make itself safe without doing the same for others. Full and complete suc-
cess requires international cooperation, and unfortunately that cooperation 
has been declining. Currently, “[t]he most serious problems [have come 
from] fractures and mistrust within the coalition . . . that the United States 
admits that it needs. . . . [Due to] changing political climates and [increa-
singly] negative perceptions of the United States, key allies are cooperating 
less.”87 Even the Saudi government, a key U.S. ally, has failed to follow 
through on its agreement to establish basic reporting mechanisms such as a 
financial intelligence unit.88 In Kuwait, financing terrorists is not even a 
criminal offense, and the United Arab Emirates has not convicted a single 
person for terrorist financing or money laundering.89 Rebuilding the focus 
and energy behind this coalition must be a priority for President Barack 
Obama if efforts at disrupting counter-terrorist financing are to continue.  
Despite significant challenges, asset recovery holds great promise 
as a tool to disrupt terrorist finances. Unlike other counter-terrorism meas-
ures, asset recovery has one unique benefit—it can be profitable. The Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has recovered over $6 billion 
over the past fifteen years pursuing litigation against persons whose negli-
85 U.S. State Dep’t, 2001 Report on Foreign Terrorist Organizations (Oct. 5, 
2001), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/2001/5258.htm. 
86 Id. 
87 Josh Meyers, Terrorism Money is Still Flowing, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2008, at A1,  
88 Josh Meyers, Saudis faulted for funding terror, L.A. Times, Apr. 2, 2008, at A8 
89 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2007 116–118 (2008), availa-
ble at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/105904.pdf.
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gence or misconduct contributed to the failure of over 700 financial institu-
tions.90 Much of this money came from aiders and abettors, including ac-
countants and lawyers whose inattention or complicity contributed to bank 
failures.91 The government of the Philippines has recovered over $650 mil-
lion from Swiss, British, and Liechtenstein banks holding accounts created 
by Former Philippine President Marcos.92 The Government of Peru has re-
covered over $174 million stashed in foreign banks by “Vladimiro Montesi-
nos, the de facto chief of intelligence and main adviser to former Peruvian 
President Alberto Fujimori from 1990 to 2000.”93 Lastly, $1.2 billion has 
been repatriated from the family of General Sani Abacha back to his home-
land, Nigeria.94
These are recent developments—all occurred within the last six 
years, and the interesting thing is that most of these recoveries were 
achieved using civil proceedings, not criminal. There is money out there and 
it can be recovered, but it may take more commitment and resources than 
many governments can allot. The solution is to tap into the more massive 
resources of the private sector. Private attorneys abhor terrorism every bit as 
much as government attorneys and as discussed above, civil procedures are 
often more effective than criminal procedures. Two famous examples of this 
are the OJ Simpson case and the Robert Blake case.95 Both celebrities were 
acquitted in criminal prosecutions for the murders of their wives, but were 
later held liable for multi-million judgments in civil proceedings.96
Government prosecutors have traditionally taken a dim view of 
providing information to civil plaintiffs because of concern that parallel 
90 See Jack Smith, Anti-Corruption Foes Intensify Focus on Bank Compliance, ACAMS 
TODAY, March/April, 2008, at 31. 
91 See Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990). Illu-
strating the complicity of attorneys and accountants, Judge Stanley Sporkin asked during the 
banking crisis of the 1990s, “Where were the outside accountants and lawyers when these 
transactions were effectuated?” Id.
92 Marcelo, supra note 7, at 92; see also Seth Myers, The World; Recovering Marcos 
Assets Proves Trying for Aquino, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1990, at Week in Review 2 (referenc-
ing Lichtenstein as one of the sources from which the assets from the Philippines were re-
covered). 
93 Guillermo Jorge, The Peruvian Efforts to Recover Proceeds from Montesinos’s Crimi-
nal Network of Corruption, in RECOVERING STOLEN ASSETS 111–12 (Mark Pieth ed., 2008). 
94 See Tim Daniel & James Maton, Recovering the Proceeds of Corruption: General Sani 
Abacha- A Nation’s Thief, in RECOVERING STOLEN ASSETS 63, 67–69 (Mark Pieth ed., 2008). 
95 Goldman Family Gets Rights to O.J. Book, ABC News, July 31, 2007, http://www.abc 
.net.au/news/stories/2007/07/31/1992929.htm?section=entertainment; Court Cuts Robert
 Blake’s wrongful death judgment, Reuters Business and Finance, April 26, 2008, available
at http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSN2641618920080426.
96 Goldman Family Gets Rights to OJ Book, ABC NEWS, July 31, 2007, http://www.abc.ne 
t.au/news/stories/2007/07/31/1992929.htm?section=entertainment; Court Cuts Robert
Blake’s Wrongful Death Judgment, REUTERS, Apr. 26, 2008.
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civil proceedings could unduly complicate criminal actions. However, it 
may be time to take a more enlightened view because of the pressing need 
to stop terrorist financing and the limitations on resources that the govern-
ment can bring to bear. As a result of the growing savings and loan crisis of 
the late 1980s, Congress changed the grand jury secrecy laws to allow dis-
closures of grand jury materials to federal and state financial institution reg-
ulators.97  Similar changes should be implemented now for terrorist financ-
ing cases brought in civil courts, and prosecutors should become more open 
to sharing information with private attorneys as appropriate on a case-by-
case basis.
In the final analysis, the most important result of an aggressive asset 
recovery program is not the amount of money recovered: it is the establish-
ment of a substantial deterrence factor against future wrongdoing. Other 
than personal ethics, it is only the prospect of losing your life savings and 
possibly going to jail that causes people to resist the temptation of contribut-
ing to sympathetic sounding terrorist appeals. It is impossible to expect law 
enforcement to stop every terrorist attack. However, by applying pressure to 
the funding sources of terrorist organizations, it is possible to restrict their 
capability to recruit and operate, and eventually vitiate their ability to re-
main relevant. 
97 18 U.S.C. § 3322 (West 2007). 
